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Abstract
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participants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment
choices. Overall, 149 subjects participated in two experiments, one with just
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and (iii) decreases with uncertainty as indicated by the difference between
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The evidence on decision biases and heuristics challenges the prescriptive validity of standard
¯nance theory which is still the dominant paradigm in modern ¯nance.1 One such violation
is the overcon¯dence bias in the sense of systematically overestimating the accuracy of one's
decisions and the precision of one's knowledge.
Overcon¯dence has been observed in many professionals (for a survey see Yates (1990)).
Most relevant for our study, overcon¯dence was found in entrepreneurs (Cooper et al. 1988),
investment bankers (Stael von Holstein 1972) and managers (Russo and Schoemaker 1992). In
particular, individuals were found to overestimate the precision of their knowledge (Fischho®
et al. 1977). Overcon¯dence was found to be strongest for questions of moderate to extreme
di±culty (Gri±n and Tversky 1992), and seems to increase with the personal importance of
the task (Frank 1935). People were also more con¯dent of their predictions in ¯elds where they
have self-declared expertise (Heath and Tversky 1991). Overcon¯dence has been explained by
selective information searching strategies (e.g., Koriat et al. 1980), by motivational factors
(e.g., Langer 1975), by imperfections in learning (e.g., Erev et al. 1994, Ferrell 1994), and,
for instance, by the experimenters' tendency to choose harder-than-normal questions (e.g.,
Gigerenzer et al. 1991, Juslin 1993, 1994).
Other studies challenge the claim that people are generally overcon¯dent (e.g., Erev et al.
1994). For an experimental asset market Maciejovsky and Kirchler (forthcoming) conclude that
overcon¯dence depends on how it is operationalized, e.g. by comparing subjective con¯dence
intervals to objective accuracy. Klayman et al. (1999) emphasize that overcon¯dence depends
on (i) how the experimenter asks questions, (ii) what one asks for, and (iii) whom one asks
indicating that individuals generally di®er in their degree of biased responses. Experimentally
alerting overcon¯dent investors can eliminate overcon¯dence (Bloom¯eld et al. 1999). Likewise,
Zacharakis and Shepherd (1999) recommend to reduce overcon¯dence by improving knowledge
and thereby the decision quality of venture capitalists.
Exceptions to overcon¯dence are reported for tasks where (i) predictability is high, where
(ii) swift and precise feedback about the accuracy of the judgments is provided, and (iii) for
highly repetitive tasks (Kahneman and Riepe 1998). Correspondingly, expert bridge players
(Keren 1987), race-track bettors (Dowie 1976, Hausch and Ziemba 1995), and meteorologists
(Murphy and Winkler 1984) were found to be well-calibrated in their predictions.
Regarding ¯nancial decisions overcon¯dence was analytically (e.g., Barber and Odean 1999,
Benos 1998, Caball¶ e and S¶ akovics 2000) and experimentally (e.g., Adams et al. 1995, Benos
and Tzafestas 1997, Camerer and Lovallo 1999) studied and also con¯rmed for ¯eld data (e.g.,
Barber and Odean 2000, Statman and Thorley 1999). Overcon¯dent investors trade too much
(Biais et al. 2000, Odean 1998, 1999), deviate from Bayes' rule when aggregating information
(NÄ oth and Weber 2000), and overreact to private and underreact to public signals (Daniel et al.
1998). Though overcon¯dent agents could thus be exploited by other market participants and
driven out of the market, some studies show that overcon¯dence can persist (e.g., Bernardo
and Welch forthcoming, Gervais and Odean 2001, Hirshleifer and Luo 2001, Kyle and Wang
1997, Wang 2001). Fellner et al. (2001) let ¯rst participants choose a portfolio which they then
1Although behavioral ¯nance increasingly attracts attention (e.g., Hirshleifer 2001).
2can substitute for an equally \good" alternative portfolio. Despite the identical payo®s their
results indicate that most participants are willing to pay in order to keep their own portfolio.
In this paper we develop a formal model allowing us to unambiguously investigate whether
participants exhibit overcon¯dence in investment decisions. We distinguish a one-risky and
a two-risky assets case. To derive unambiguous optimal choices, we induce risk aversion by
the binary lottery-method (Berg et al. 1986). In the experiments, the own investment choice
can be substituted for (i) the optimal investment solution, (ii) a \risk averse" and (iii) a \risk
loving" investment choice. We require a more systematic display of overcon¯dence by de¯ning
overcon¯dence as the consistent higher evaluation of the own investment choice with regard to
all three investment alternatives.
The next section presents the one-asset and the two-assets model. In section 3, we introduce
the two experiments by describing their procedure and design, and present our results. Section
4 summarizes our main ¯ndings and concludes.
2. The models
In this section, we present the one-risky asset model and the two-risky assets model and derive
the optimal solution for the ¯rst model and the ¯rst-order conditions for the second model.
In order to contrast observed behavior with optimal choices we induce risk aversion by the
binary-lottery mechanism. In the following this mechanism is brie°y introduced.
2.1. Inducing of risk aversion
The decision maker can win either a low (M) or a high (M) monetary prize with
0 < M < M (1)
The decision maker is paid by the lottery
L = (Mj1 ¡ W;MjW) (2)
o®ering the monetary reward M with probability 1¡W and M with probability W. For given
monetary rewards M and M satisfying (1) the lottery L is just a function of W, i.e. L = L(W).
Decision behavior does not directly determine W but just the number of points P which
one earns. This number P maps into W = W(P) via
W = W(P) = P® with 0 < ® < 1: (3)
Due to 0 < ® < 1 the function W(P) is strictly concave so that the decision maker is risk
averse with respect to investment success measured in points.
32.2. One risky asset
The decision maker is endowed with a positive number P0, large enough to guarantee P > 0,
and can invest any amount
0 · i · ¹ i < P0 with 0 < ¹ i < P0 (4)
into a risky asset A. This asset has a unit price 1 (in points) and pays dividends d and ¹ d with
d < 0 < ¹ d per unit (in points) with probability w and 1 ¡ w, respectively where 0 < w < 1.
If one buys i units, payments are id with probability w and i¹ d with probability 1 ¡ w. The
remaining amount P0¡i is automatically invested in a riskless bond with an interest r satisfying
0 < r < wd + (1 ¡ w)¹ d: (5)
Thus, compared to the bond the risky asset yields a higher expected return but is also more
risky. For any given decision i satisfying (4) the number of points P earned is thus given by
the lottery
P = [(P0 ¡ i)r + idjw;(P0 ¡ i)r + i¹ dj1 ¡ w]: (6)
The positive di®erence P0 ¡¹ i is chosen in such a way that P is positive, even in case of ¹ id.
Similarly, in case of ¹ i¹ d the number of points should yield a probability W(P) = P ® smaller
than 1.
According to (3) the decision i is evaluated by the cardinal utility
W(i) = W[P(i)] = w[(P0 ¡ i)r + id]® + (1 ¡ w)[(P0 ¡ i)r + i¹ d]® (7)
This follows from two intuitive properties:2
(A.1) The decision maker prefers more (M) to less (M) money (and thus larger to smaller
winning probabilities for the higher monetary prize M)).
(A.2) The decision maker satis¯es the reduction principle in probability calculation (when
anticipating which probability W a certain investment level i implies).
Proposition 1 Under (A.1) and (A.2) the decision maker's cardinal utility u[L(i)] = W[P(i)]
can be expressed by W(i) given in (7).






r ¡ ¹ d
¶¸1=1¡®
=
(P0 ¡ i)r + id
(P0 ¡ i)r + i¹ d
(8)
2According to (A.1) the decision maker chooses i such that it maximizes W. By (3) and (A.2) the probability
is, however, determined by (7). Denote by u(M) the utility of earning M with certainty and by u(M) the
corresponding utility for M. Due to (A.1), u(M) < u(M). Since cardinal utilities are only uniquely de¯ned
up to positively a±ne transformations, we can set u(M) = 0 and u(M) = 1.
4Table 1: Probability Matrix of Repayments
d2 d2
d1 a b
d1 c 1 ¡ a ¡ b ¡ c







r ¡ ¹ d
¶¸1=1¡®
(9)
an interior optimum i? can be described as
i? =
(1 ¡ R)rP0
R¹ d ¡ d + (1 ¡ R)r
: (10)
Proposition 2 Under assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) and given the parameter restrictions guar-
anteeing 0 < i? < ¹ i the optimal investment level i? is given by equation (10).
The condition 0 < i? < ¹ i will be checked numerically only for the experimentally chosen
parameter constellations. In the experiment the decision maker ¯rst chooses his/her investment
level i in the range (4) and then is o®ered successively to switch to three di®erent predetermined
alternative investment levels ^ i of which one is the optimal choice i?.
2.3. Two risky assets
So far our analysis has been restricted to one riskless and one risky asset. However, over-
and undercon¯dence, respectively may depend on cognitive capacity and e®ort. Introducing
a second risky asset complicates the investment decision considerably. In line with previous
empirical evidence indicating that overcon¯dence is positively related to task di±culty, we
expect individual overcon¯dence to be more pronounced with the two risky assets.
Let i = 1;2 denote the two risky assets whose repayments can assume just two levels
di 2 di;di with 0 < di < 1 < di. The stochastic process determining the repayment vector
(d1;d2) is assumed to be governed by the probability matrix in Table 1 whose entries are
assumed to satisfy a;b;c > 0 and a + b + c < 1. The case of independence with only two
degrees of freedom can be captured by
a = (a + b)(a + c) or b = b(a;c) = a
1 ¡ (a + c)
a + c
(11)
Due to parameter restrictions the level b(a;c) is positive and smaller than 1. In our
experiment we will distinguish a case of negatively correlated repayments (a = 1=6;b = c =
1=3) and one of independence (a = b = 1=6;c = 1=3).
5Repayments are in points whose sum
P = P(i1;i2) = (P0 ¡ i1 ¡ i2) +
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
d1i1 + d2i2 with probability a
d1i1 + d2i2 with probability b
d1i1 + d2i2 with probability c
d1i1 + d2i2 with probability 1 ¡ a ¡ b ¡ c
(12)
is transformed via W(P) = P ® with 0 < ® < 1 into the winning probability W for the large
monetary reward. For a local optimum the two ¯rst order-conditions are
£
aP(a)®¡1 + bP(b)®¡1¤
(1 ¡ d1) =
£
cP(c)®¡1 + (1 ¡ a ¡ b ¡ c)P(e)®¡1¤




(1 ¡ d2) =
£
bP(b)®¡1 + (1 ¡ a ¡ b ¡ c)P(e)®¡1¤
(1 ¡ d2) (14)
where
P(a) = P0 ¡ i1 ¡ i2 + d1i1 + d2i2
P(b) = P0 ¡ i1 ¡ i2 + d1i1 + d2i2
P(c) = P0 ¡ i1 ¡ i2 + d1i1 + d2i2
P(e) = P0 ¡ i1 ¡ i2 + d1i1 + d2i2: (15)
The optimal solution (i?
1;i?
2) for given parameters will be calculated numerically. For notational
ease the vector (i1;i2) is denoted by i in the following.
2.4. Switching procedure and behavioral expectations
The willingness to switch from the own choice i to an alternative choice ^ i is elicited by using
the random price mechanism (Becker et al. 1964) with random prices (in probability) x from
the interval
x 2 [x; ¹ x] with x < 0 < ¹ x (16)
and some density ' with
'(x) =
(
> 0 8x 2 [x; ¹ x]
= 0 otherwise.
(17)
The bounderies x and x are chosen such that the optimal limit is always an interior point.
When eliciting the willingness to pay for keeping the own investment choice one, for in-
stance, chooses a limit l in the sense that whenever x · l one would pay x points and keep
the own investment i instead of ^ i, whereas for x > l one would pay nothing and obtain the
6alternative investment ^ i. Thus, utility now depends on i;^ i;l and x via:
W = W(i;^ i;l;x) =
(
W(i) ¡ x for x · l
W(^ i) for x > l:
(18)
Since the price x is independent of l, the optimal limit l? is
l?(i;^ i) = W(i) ¡ W(^ i): (19)
Proposition 3 Rational switching requires l?(i;^ i) = W(i) ¡ W(^ i).
Participants did not only confront the optimal alternative i? but also alternative investment
levels ^ i = i¡ and ^ i = i+ satisfying
0 < i¡ < i? < i+ < ¹ i: (20)
If one has chosen optimally before, i.e. i = i?, and if ^ i 6= i? one should choose a positive limit
l(i?;^ i). In view of the overcon¯dence hypothesis we expect positive limits even for ^ i = i? and
i 6= i?.
When classifying participants as over- and undercon¯dent or neither one we use two ap-
proaches:
(i) The heuristic approach (HA) simply requires for over(under)con¯dence that
l(i;^ i¡);l(i;^ i?);l(i;^ i+) > 0(< 0).3
(ii) The statistical approach (SA) demands for over(under)con¯dence that
l(i;^ i¡);l(i;^ i?);l(i;^ i+) are signi¯cantly larger (smaller) than their optimal counterparts
l?(i;^ i¡);l?(i;^ i?);l?(i;^ i+).4
Decision makers often display a large discrepancy between their willingness to accept (wta) and
their willingness to pay (wtp) (e.g., Bateman et al. 1997, Harless 1989, Kahneman et al. 1990).
By eliciting both we can control for the endowment e®ect and test the correlation between
over(under)con¯dence and the wta/wtp disparity. We will refer to consistent overcon¯dence
if and only if the decision maker is classi¯ed by both, the willingness to pay and the willingness
to accept, as overcon¯dent by either approach.
When for the decision maker the value of the object is less certain the wta/wtp disparity
should increase (Kolstadt and Guzman 1999, Mueser and Dow 1997). Since being less certain
about something suggests a lower level of con¯dence, we expect the wta/wtp disparity to be
negatively correlated with the level of con¯dence.
3One will not want to switch from i to ^ i if one considers i as better than ^ i. In such a case one wants to be
rewarded for giving up i. On the other hand, one might regret one's choice and prefer ^ i over i. In such a
case one would be even willing to pay for switching from i to ^ i. Our test of over(under)con¯dence requires
that all three limits l(i;^ i¡), l(i;^ i
?) and l(i;^ i+) are positive (negative).
4If l
?(i;^ i) is the optimal limit we classify a decision maker as persistently overcon¯dent when l(i;^ i) is signif-
icantly larger than l
?(i;^ i). Otherwise, we will speak of persistent undercon¯dence if l(i;^ i) is signi¯cantly
smaller than l
?(i;^ i).
7Of course, we do not expect participants to engage in the proper (probability) calculus
leading to i? but rather to rely on aspiration levels, e.g. by a lower bound for (P0 ¡ i) or for
the sure interest (P0 ¡ i)r which can be used to cover (hedge) the risk resulting from positive
investments i. Most investment levels i should be, furthermore, prominent shares of P0 (Albers
1997). If P0 is a prominent number, e.g. P0 = 100, prominence should not support rationality
(which has been avoided by an appropriate speci¯cation of the model parameters).
3. The experiments
We conducted two experiments. The ¯rst one investigates individual investment behavior
involving only one risky asset, whereas the second experiment involves two di®erent risky
assets.
3.1. Experiment I
Experiment I was conducted at the Humboldt-University of Berlin's experimental economics
computer lab in June 2001 on three consecutive days with 72 participants in total. Twenty-
eight participants were females and 44 males, studying business administration and economics
with an average age of 23 years, ranging from 19 to 31. The low monetary prize M was DM
15 and the high monetary prize M DM 40 leading to an average payment of DM 26.81. Each
session lasted for about 70 minutes.
3.1.1. Experimental design and procedure
While reading the instructions (see Appendix A) participants can privately ask questions.
Afterwards they are asked to solve two problems related to the experiment. The problems
are then solved by one experimenter in public to let participants learn how to calculate the
probability of earning the high monetary prize. The instructions refer to lottery tickets and
avoid the notion of probabilities. The probability of earning the high monetary prize W(i) is
transformed to a number of lottery tickets by multiplying it by 1000. Thus, each lottery ticket
amounts to a 0.1% chance of earning the high monetary prize M.
The experiment was conducted computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). After read-
ing the instructions participants make four investment decisions for four di®erent risky assets
(see Table 2), whereby their endowment is always P0 = 100. The upper limit for investments ¹ i
is set to 80 so that P > 0 holds for all possible investments i. After each investment decision,
participants successively confronted the alternative investment levels ^ i¡;^ i? and ^ i+ in a ran-
domized order and determined their limit for substituting their own choice i by the alternative
^ i under consideration.5 Participants are not told that one of the three alternative investment
levels for each investment decision is the optimal one. The interval for the random price mech-
anism was set to [¡49;50]. Only one randomly selected decision is ¯nally chosen to determine
the participants' payo®.
5More speci¯cally, we ask them: \How many lottery tickets are you willing to pay in order not to have to
switch to the alternative investment level?" and \How many lottery tickets do we have to pay you so that
you are willing to switch to the alternative investment level?"
8Table 2: Parameters for the four di®erent investment decisions
r d ¹ d w ® i
? W(i
?) i¡ W(i¡) i+ W(i+)
0:0010 ¡0:0001 0:006 0:65 0:5 43 0.346 23 0.340 71 0.332
0:0010 ¡0:0001 0:006 0:67 0:5 38 0.340 21 0.330 63 0.335
0:0007 ¡0:0001 0:006 0:65 0:5 53 0.315 29 0.306 77 0.302
0:0010 ¡0:0001 0:007 0:70 0:5 37 0.341 19 0.336 74 0.317























Figure 1: Participants' investment levels for all decisions
After all decisions are made participants are told which of their decisions has been ran-
domly selected for payment and are asked to answer a short post-experimental questionnaire.
The experimenters publicly determine whether the relevant risky asset yields a high or low div-
idend by using a ten-sided die, and apply the random price mechanism6 for each participant
individually. Final payment for each participant is determined by choosing a random number
of points. A participant earns the high monetary prize if this number is less or equal to the
number of lottery tickets, otherwise the participant earns the low monetary prize.
3.1.2. Results
Let us start by describing individual investment choices. From Figure 1 one can see that most
investment levels i are prominent shares of 100 in the form of integer multiples of 10 or (less
often) of 5. Only 20 out of 288 (6.9%) investment decisions are not prominent in this sense.
Average investments exceed the optimal ones (pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test) with 7.5
as mean di®erence. Since for 61 of our participants we cannot reject optimal investment choices
6We have to subtract 50 from the number of points generated by two ten-sided dice to get the interval [¡49;50].
9Table 3: Number of participants classi¯ed as over- or noncon¯dent
overcon¯dent noncon¯dent
times 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
participants (wtp)a 8 12 12 13 20 3 0 1 0
participants (wta)b 41 11 10 6 3 0 0 0 0
a Two participants were classi¯ed as once both over- and noncon¯dent. One
participant was classi¯ed as twice overcon¯dent and once noncon¯dent.
b One participant was once classi¯ed as noncon¯dent and three times as over-
con¯dent.
(pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test at the 10% con¯dence level) risk aversion has been induced
rather e®ectively.
The average optimal limit l? equals ¡3:78, indicating that mostly investments i were not as
good in terms of W(i) as the alternatives. Our participants, however, valued their investments
quite di®erently. First, we observe a signi¯cant wta/wtp disparity (Wilcoxon rank sum test,
p < 0:001). The mean limit resulting from the wta question (lwta = 29:34) is well above the
mean limit resulting from the wtp question (lwtp = 10:29). Second, the median limit for each
of the three alternative investments is positive.
We now focus on individual decisions and apply our con¯dence classi¯cation, with respect
(i) to the heuristic approach, and (ii) to the statistically motivated one.
According to HA, a participant is classi¯ed as overcon¯dent if all three limits are positive,
and as noncon¯dent if all three limits are negative. Table 3 lists the frequency of participants
who were classi¯ed as either overcon¯dent or noncon¯dent for wtp and wta limits. Since
every participant is classi¯ed four times we can statistically test (Wilcoxon rank sum test)
whether (s)he shows consistent behavior. If a participant is classi¯ed at least three times in
either category this classi¯cation is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level. This insistence on
statistical signi¯cance makes our classi¯cation robust against small random deviations from
induced risk preferences. As a result 20 out of 72 participants are overcon¯dent in the sense of
consistently overevaluating their own investment decision by their limits lwtp. Using lwta for
classi¯cation even 52 participants are overcon¯dent.
With respect to SA, we focus on the di®erence between actual limits l and optimal limits
l? for each participant and apply the pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test for classi¯cation. If
these limits l are signi¯cantly larger at the 1% level than the optimal levels l? we classify the
participant as persistently overcon¯dent and if the limits l are signi¯cantly smaller than the
optimal l? as persistently undercon¯dent. Applying this approach yields the following results:
With respect to the limits lwtp we classify 35 participants as persistently overcon¯dent, and
37 as neither persistently over- nor undercon¯dent. For the limits lwta 58 participants are
persistently overcon¯dent, and 14 are not classi¯ed in either category.
In view of the di®erent numbers of overcon¯dence classi¯cations we apply our de¯nition of
consistent over- and undercon¯dence. Now only those participants who are classi¯ed into the
same category by both wta and wtp data are called consistently over- and undercon¯dent,
respectively. This implies that a participant, classi¯ed as consistently overcon¯dent by HA
remains consistently overcon¯dent in view of SA, but not vice versa.
10Table 4: Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: consistent overcon¯dence classi¯cation
Method: ML - Binary Probit
QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariance
Variable Coe±cient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
constant 5:142057 2:507111 2:050990 0:0403
age ¡0:059959 0:085218 ¡0:7035916 0:4817
sex ¡0:879255 0:369041 ¡2:232540 0:0172
math mark ¡0:258057 0:212001 ¡1:217241 0:2235
self-assessment ¡0:069386 0:184353 ¡0:375156 0:7075
wta/wtp ¡0:023176 0:012541 ¡1:848036 0:0646
mean absolute i ¡ i
? 0:083188 0:021081 3:946108 0:0001
time invest ¡0:008515 0:007397 ¡1:151161 0:2497
time alternative ¡0:001196 0:009603 ¡0:124544 0:9009
FKK-PC ¡0:031202 0:018823 ¡1:657637 0:0974
FKK-SKI ¡0:030307 0:019241 ¡1:575139 0:1152
Mean dependent var 0.416667 S.D. dependent var 0.496466
S.E. of regression 0.444725 Akaike info criterion 1.294803
Sum squared resid 12.06461 Schwarz criterion 1.642627
Log likelihood -35.61291 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.433273
Restr. log likelihood -48.90192 Avg. log likelihood -0.494624
LR statistic (10 df) 26.57802 McFadden R-squared 0.271748
Probability(LR stat) 0.003036
Which features characterize an overcon¯dent participant? We answer this question by
running a binary probit regression (see Table 4). The dependent variable is the vector of
consistent classi¯cations by SA, i.e. a vector of \1s" for persistently overcon¯dent participants
and \0s" otherwise. The covariates are age, gender (\1": male,\0": female), math mark (of
the university entrance quali¯cation / high school exam) and self-assessment of being a good
student. Since the post-experimental questionnaire asks for competence and control (Krampen
1989) resulting in 2 scales (generalized self-e®ectiveness (FKK-SKI) and generalized beliefs in
external control (FKK-PC)), these scales will be covariates, too. Additionally, we include the
vector of the wta/wtp di®erences, the vector of the mean absolute di®erences of investments
and optimal investments and a vector of the average time needed for investment decisions and
trading investment alternatives.
As the likelihood ratio statistic shows, our regression model is indeed a signi¯cant improve-
ment to the naÄ ³ve assumption of constant probability classi¯cations as overcon¯dent. Neither
age, math mark nor self-assessment are signi¯cant. The same is true for both, time vari-
ables and the scale of generalized self-e®ectiveness. According to our regression gender has
a signi¯cant in°uence on overcon¯dence classi¯cations, however, the sign contradicts previ-
ous evidence that males are more prone to overcon¯dence than females (e.g., Huberman and
Rubinstein 2000, Lundeberg et al. 1994).
The further signi¯cant covariates are the wta/wtp disparity, the mean deviation from
optimal to actual investment and the scale of generalized beliefs in external control. A
larger wta/wtp di®erence leads to a smaller probability of overcon¯dence. Interpreting the
wta/wtp disparity as an indicator of uncertainty in evaluating own versus alternative in-
11Table 5: Parameters for the four di®erent investment decisions
d1 ¹ d1 d2 ¹ d2 a b c i
? i¡ i+
parameter sequence 1
0:1 2:23 0:2 2:04 0:17 0:33 0:33 (36;37) (18;18) (53;51)
0:1 1:94 0:2 2:16 0:17 0:17 0:33 (63;26) (31;13) (76;34)
0:5 1:55 0:7 1:31 0:17 0:17 0:33 (129;6) (63;3) (144;37)
0:3 1:94 0:3 1:78 0:17 0:33 0:33 (43;27) (23;7) (63;47)
parameter sequence 2
0:1 2:23 0:2 2:04 0:17 0:17 0:33 (79;13) (33;7) (87;24)
0:1 1:94 0:2 2:16 0:17 0:33 0:33 (17;43) (9;21) (34;73)
0:5 1:55 0:7 1:31 0:17 0:33 0:33 (23;23) (11;12) (51;57)
0:3 1:94 0:3 1:78 0:17 0:17 0:33 (103;6) (63;3) (123;17)
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote the alternative investments in risky assets 1 and 2, respectively.
vestments, participants are less likely overcon¯dent the higher the degree of uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, the larger the mean deviation from optimal to actual investment the more likely a
participant is classi¯ed as overcon¯dent. This con¯rms our intuition that those who performed
poorly at the investment task do not recognize their non-competence (e.g., Kruger and Dun-
ning 1999). Finally, participants believing more that their life is controlled by external factors
are less likely classi¯ed as overcon¯dent.
3.2. Experiment II
Experiment II was also conducted at the Humboldt-University of Berlin with 77 participants in
total. Twenty-eight females and 49 males, all students of business administration or economics
with an average age of 23 years, ranging from 19 to 28. The low monetary prize M was DM
10 and the high monetary prize M was DM 40 leading to an average payment of DM 26.36.
Each session lasted for about 80 minutes.
3.2.1. Experimental design and procedure
The only di®erence to Experiment I is that instead of the opportunity to invest in just one risky
asset, participants can now invest in two di®erent risky assets (for instructions see Appendix B).
We conducted two treatments using the same parameters except for changing the correlation
structure of the risky assets, to test for di®erences between no correlation and negatively
correlated risky assets (see Table 5).
3.2.2. Results
Overall, only 63 out of 616 (10.2%) investment choices do not qualify as prominent shares of
100. There are no signi¯cant di®erences between the sequences of uncorrelated (a = b = 1=6)
and negatively correlated (a = 1=6, b = 1=3) assets regarding median investments, wta/wtp
levels and spread (Wilcoxon rank sum test, ® = 0:05). A few minor e®ects with respect to the
two correlation structures of the assets are: First, the median di®erence between actual and
optimal investment choices is 11, indicating that observed choices signi¯cantly exceed optimal
12Table 6: Number of participants classi¯ed as over- or noncon¯dent
overcon¯dent noncon¯dent
times 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
participants (wtp) 21 12 16 12 12 1 1 0 1
participants (wta) 43 17 8 3 5 0 0 0 0
choices (pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test, p < 0:0001). Second, for uncorrelated risky assets
this median di®erence is 30, whereas for negatively correlated risky assets it is ¡9, indicating
over- and underinvestment respectively.
Since we cannot reject optimal investment choices (pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test at the
10% con¯dence level) for 64 of our participants our results support like in Experiment I the
intended induction of risk aversion.
The average optimal limit l? is ¡8:08, indicating that investments i were not as good in
terms of W(i) as the alternatives. This holds for both, the uncorrelated and the negatively
correlated risky assets, whose average optimal limits are ¡8:02 and ¡8:14, respectively. Like in
Experiment I, we observe di®erent evaluations with respect to mean limits lWTA = 29:35 and
lWTP = 12:34. Again, the wta/wtp disparity is highly signi¯cant (p < 0:001). However, the
observed median limits do not depend on the correlation structure of the risky assets (Wilcoxon
rank sum test for the di®erences of the median limits l between uncorrelated and negatively
correlated investment tasks, p = 0:175).
Table 6 lists the frequency of participants who are classi¯ed as either overcon¯dent or
noncon¯dent according to HA. Insisting on statistically signi¯cant classi¯cations, 33 out of 77
participants are overcon¯dent with respect to their limits lWTP, and even 60 participants are
overcon¯dent according to lWTA.
According to SA, 60 participants are classi¯ed as persistently overcon¯dent with respect to
the limits lWTP, one as persistently undercon¯dent, and 16 as neither one. For the limits lWTA,
72 participants are persistently overcon¯dent and the remaining 5 participants are neither
persistently over- nor undercon¯dent.
Thus like in Experiment I, HA and SA lead to inconsistent classi¯cations. We therefore
again apply our de¯nition of consistent overcon¯dence, reducing the disparity between the
two approaches. Now only those participants who are classi¯ed into the same category by
both wta and wtp data are referred to as consistently under- and overcon¯dent, respectively.
All 32 participants who are classi¯ed as consistently overcon¯dent by HA are consistently
overcon¯dent in the view of SA, too.
The results of the binary probit regression (see Table 7) yield three signi¯cant covariates:
age, wta/wtp disparity, and mean absolute deviation from optimal investment which is now
measured as the euclidian distance between observed and optimal investment choice. First,
age is negatively correlated with overcon¯dence, indicating that an older participant is less
likely classi¯ed as overcon¯dent. Second, the larger the wta/wtp disparity the smaller is the
probability of overcon¯dence. And third, a larger deviation from optimal investment leads to
a higher probability of being classi¯ed as overcon¯dent.
13Table 7: Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: consistent overcon¯dence classi¯cation
Method: ML - Binary Probit
QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariance
Variable Coe±cient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
constant ¡6:975185 3:573308 ¡1:952024 0:0509
age 0:237570 0:098072 2:422397 0:0154
sex 0:426292 0:374695 1:137702 0:2552
math mark ¡0:280504 0:215306 ¡1:302813 0:1926
self-assessment 0:060838 0:197227 0:308465 0:7577
wta/wtp ¡0:055053 0:013989 ¡3:935426 0:0001
mean absolute i ¡ i
? 0:054345 0:019024 2:856703 0:0043
time invest ¡0:002163 0:002479 ¡0:872776 0:3828
time alternative 0:001734 0:001145 1:514132 0:1300
FKK-PC ¡0:000073 0:020007 0:003675 0:9971
FKK-SKI 0:002815 0:022602 0:124547 0:9009
Mean dependent var 0.753247 S.D. dependent var 0.433949
S.E. of regression 0.397256 Akaike info criterion 1.069217
Sum squared resid 9.897914 Schwarz criterion 1.040475
Log likelihood -30.16486 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.203146
Restr. log likelihood -43.02298 Avg. log likelihood -0.391751
LR statistic (10 df) 25.71624 McFadden R-squared 0.298866
Probability(LR stat) 0.004141
4. Discussion
We experimentally induced risk aversion and investigated overcon¯dence in an investment
context by comparing actual investment choices with alternative ones. Overall, we conducted
two di®erent experiments, one with just one risky asset, the second one with two di®erent
risky assets. The residual endowment was automatically invested in a riskless bond. After
selecting their own investment level participants confronted three alternative investment choices
(including the optimal one) and were asked for their willingness to pay (wtp) and for their
willingness to accept (wta) for substituting the own for an alternative investment choice.
According to our results overcon¯dence (i) increases with the deviation of actual from op-
timal investments, indicating that the less accurate their investment decisions are the more
prone are participants to exhibit overcon¯dence. We (ii) demonstrate that overcon¯dence in-
creases with task complexity, that is overcon¯dence is more pronounced in the more complex
two-assets case. The results (iii) indicate that overcon¯dence decreases with the wta/wtp
disparity. In at least one of the two experiments, we (iv) found that those participants who
believe that their life is largely controlled by external factors are less often classi¯ed as over-
con¯dent, whereas, rather surprisingly, (v) males are less prone to overcon¯dence than females.
Finally, we (vi) observed that age is negatively correlated with overcon¯dence.
One drawback of our study is the binary lottery mechanism for inducing risk aversion.
There is experimental evidence questioning the reliability of the binary lottery mechanism
(e.g., Selten et al. 1999) There is, however, also evidence supporting the notion of \general"
risk aversion in experimental studies, even for low stakes and without experimentally inducing
14it (Holt and Laury 2001). Since we wanted to contrast actual with optimal investment choices,
we had to control for risk attitudes in one way or another. As we have allowed for small random
deviations from optimality, we feel con¯dent that our tests yield a reliable classi¯cation.
Since our experimental approach focuses on individual investment, future research should
further investigate overcon¯dence in the context of a competitive market environment in order
to establish whether or not overcon¯dence survives the market. Also, further research on the
relation between overcon¯dence and personality traits, such as attribution styles, is needed to
learn when and why certain characteristics trigger overcon¯dence.
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17Appendix
A. Instructions of Experiment I
In this experiment you will make several decisions. Your ¯nal payo® does not depend on the decisions
of other participants. Instead, payo® will be determined for each participant individually solely on
basis of his/her own decisions.
You will have to make a total of four investment decisions. You can choose between a risky asset and
a riskless bond. The risky asset can yield negative and positive payo®s. You will be informed about
the corresponding probabilities later in the experiment. The positive payo® of the risky asset exceeds
the payo® of the riskless asset.
Your endowment is 100 Guilders, out of which you can invest at most 80 Guilders in the risky asset
(in order to avoid losses). The amount of Guilders which is not invested in the risky asset is
automatically invested in the riskless bond.
The payo® will not be made in monetary units, but in lottery tickets. The better your decisions the
more lottery tickets you get. Overall, there are 1,000 lottery tickets. The high payo® of the lottery is
DM 40.-, whereas the low payo® is DM 15.- With your choices you can in°uence the number of lottery
tickets yielding the high payo®.
After your investment decision you will be presented alternative investment choices, and you are asked
under which conditions you accept to switch.
Whether you can keep your initial investment choice will be determined by throwing two dice. If L is
the amount of lottery tickets, which you are willing to pay in order not to switch, you can keep your
investment decision if the dice yields a number smaller or equal to L. However, you have to pay the
number shown by the dice. If the dice show a number larger than L, you will have to switch to the
alternative investment choice. If you want to switch from your initial investment decision to the
alternative choice you can also state a negative amount. L must be in the interval from -49 to 50.
You also have to state your minimum price at which you accept to switch from your initial investment
decision to the alternative one. Again this will be determined by throwing two dice. If L is the amount
of lottery tickets, which you require for switching, you have to switch if the dice yield a number which
is higher to L. In this case you will get the number shown by the dice. You keep your initial investment
choice if the dice yield a number which is smaller or equal to L. If you want to switch from your initial
investment choice you can even state a negative amount. L must be in the interval from -49 to 50.
We will randomly determine which of your decisions will be relevant for your payo®. Please note that
each of your decisions can be randomly selected.
By using the dice we will randomly decide whether the risky asset yields a high or a low payo® which
determines the number of lottery tickets you get. Then we will randomly select the winning lottery
ticket. Finally, you will paid out your resulting prize.
18Decision sheet
Code-No.: Date: Time:
May P be your possible payo® given your investment choice. You then get 1000 ¤
p
P lottery tickets.
The risky asset yields a dividend of 0:006 per unit with a probability of 35%, and a dividend of
¡0:0001 per unit with a probability of 65%. The possible number of lottery tickets given an
investment level of i Guilders is:
1000 ¤
p
(100 ¡ i) ¤ 0:001 + i ¤ 0:006 with probability 35%
or 1000 ¤
p
(100 ¡ i) ¤ 0:001 ¡ i ¤ 0:0001 with probability 65%.
How many lottery tickets will you get in case of the high dividend of 0:006, if you invest 100 Guilders?
How many lottery tickets will you get in case of the negative dividend of ¡0:0001, if you do not invest
any Guilders in the risky asset?
19B. Instructions of Experiment II
In this experiment you will make several decisions. Your ¯nal payo® does not depend on the decisions
of other participants. Instead, payo® will be determined for each participant individually solely on
basis of his/her own decisions.
You will have to make a total of four investment decisions. You can choose between two risky assets
and a riskless bond. The risky assets can low and high payo®s. You will be informed about the
corresponding probabilities later in the experiment. The high payo® of the risky asset exceeds the
payo® of the riskless asset.
Your endowment is 100 Guilders, however it is also possible to invest more, since we are granting you
a costless credit. Nevertheless we guarantee that even in case of the low dividends you can meet your
obligations. The amount of Guilders which is not invested in the risky assets is automatically invested
in the riskless bond.
The payo® will not be made in monetary units, but in lottery tickets. The better your decisions the
more lottery tickets you get. Overall, there are 1,000 lottery tickets. The high payo® of the lottery is
DM 40.-, whereas the low payo® is DM 10.- With your choices you can in°uence the number of lottery
tickets yielding the high payo®.
After your investment decision you will be presented alternative investment choices, and you are asked
under which conditions you accept to switch.
Whether you can keep your initial investment choice will be determined by throwing two dice. If L is
the amount of lottery tickets, which you are willing to pay in order not to switch, you can keep your
investment decision if the dice yields a number smaller or equal to L. However, you have to pay the
number shown by the dice. If the dice show a number larger than L, you will have to switch to the
alternative investment choice. If you want to switch from your initial investment decision to the
alternative choice you can also state a negative amount. L must be in the interval from -49 to 50.
You also have to state your minimum price at which you accept to switch from your initial investment
decision to the alternative one. Again this will be determined by throwing two dice. If L is the amount
of lottery tickets, which you require for switching, you have to switch if the dice yield a number which
is higher to L. In this case you will get the number shown by the dice. You keep your initial investment
choice if the dice yield a number which is smaller or equal to L. If you want to switch from your initial
investment choice you can even state a negative amount. L must be in the interval from -49 to 50.
We will randomly determine which of your decisions will be relevant for your payo®. Please note that
each of your decisions can be randomly selected.
By using the dice we will randomly decide whether the risky asset yields a high or a low payo® which
determines the number of lottery tickets you get. Then we will randomly select the winning lottery
ticket. Finally, you will paid out your resulting prize.
20Decision sheet
Code-No.: Date: Time:
May P be your possible payo® given your investment choice. You then get 30 ¤
p
P lottery tickets.
Asset A yields either a dividend of ¡90% or a high dividend of 100%. Asset B yields either a dividend
of ¡50% or a high dividend of 50%.
The probability for both assets to yield a high dividend is 1=3, whereas the probability for both assets
to yield a low dividend is 1=6. The probability for asset A to yield a high dividend is and asset B to
yield a low dividend is 1=3, whereas the probability for asset B to yield a high dividend and for asset
A to yield a low dividend is 1=6.
The possible payo®s in lottery tickets given you invested i in asset A and j in asset B are:
30
p
100 ¡ i ¡ j + 2i + 1:5j (21)
30
p
100 ¡ i ¡ j + 0:1i + 0:5j (22)
30
p
100 ¡ i ¡ j + 2i + 0:5j (23)
30
p
100 ¡ i ¡ j + 0:1i + 1:5j (24)
How many lottery tickets will you get, if you invest 20 Guilders in each of the risky assets and both
yield the high dividend?
How many lottery tickets will you get, if you invest 20 Guilders in each of the risky assets and both
yield the low dividend?
21